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The smuggling will never stop. As long as seawater is still seawater and as long as 
the sea still has water in it, smuggling will continue in the Riau Islands.  
Tengku Umar, owner of an import-export business  
Borders are lucrative zones of exchange and trade, much of it clandestine. Smuggling, by 
definition, 'depends on the presence of a border, and on what the state declares can be legally 
imported or exported' (Donnan & Wilson 1999: 101), and while free trade zones and growth 
triangles welcome the free movement of goods and services, border regions can also become 
heightened areas of state control that provide an environment in which smuggling thrives. 
Donnan and Wilson (1999: 88) argue that acts of smuggling are a form of subversion or 
resistance to the existence of the border, and therefore the state. However, there is not always 
a conflict of interest and struggle between state authorities and smugglers (Megoran, 
Raballand, & Bouyjou 2005). Synergies between the formal and informal economies ensure 
that illegal cross-border trade does not operate independently of systems of formal regulatory 
authority. Smugglers are frequently subject to a system of unofficial 'rules of law' developed 
through tacit agreement among trading parties, which operates in parallel to regulations 
imposed by the state (cf. Chang 2004; Walker 1999). The existence of these parallel 
regulatory systems creates a situation where smuggling can constitute a form of informal 
power in opposition to state power while at the same time being integrated into state 
apparatuses. Indeed, studies of smuggling demonstrate that collusion by state authorities is 
almost always essential for illegal cross-border trade to occur (Chang 2004; Niger-Thomas 
2001; Van Schendel 1993). Like many other forms of illicit cross-border exchange, 
smuggling thus reveals the paradox of the border: even as illegal cross-border trade works to 
undermine the state, it also works to constitute it (Donnan & Wilson 1999: 106).  
In this chapter, we examine the unauthorised movement of goods across the border to and 
from Indonesia's Riau Islands from the perspective of the individuals who smuggle and 
consume them, and from the perspective of local agents of the state - individuals whose 
stories demonstrate the multiple meanings associated with cross-border flows across the 
straits and, in doing so, shed light on how state practices intersect with competing ideas about 
legality and licitness.1 The first part of the chapter examines this nexus between the historical 
formation of the border and cross-border flows of goods in the colonial and post-colonial 
periods.2 Here we show that although many individuals who live in the Riau Islands 
experience the border as a boundary and as the imposition of state rule, it also represents a 
resource that can be exploited. The second part of the chapter demonstrates how the often 
contradictory processes of bordering have shaped not only the ways that Riau Islanders 
imagine the border but also the state's changing definitions of, and responses to, smuggling. 
ln particular, our study of the Riau Islands reveals that local state involvement in 'illegal' acts 
(such as corruption that supports smuggling) can be seen as a legitimate response to local 
needs and the perceived failures of the national government and legal system- a fact that 
points to the need to explore local ecologies of licitness (and illegality) not just in terms of 
community perceptions but also in terms of different levels of the state. 
Local responses to evolving practices of bordering 
Smuggling has been an integral part of life in the Riau Islands since the British and Dutch 
began to carve out spaces of economic interest in the Straits of Malacca. Since the late 1800s, 
cross-border flows of goods (and people) have been shaped by efforts to create borders 
through the establishment of colonial territories and then new sovereign states. The Straits of 
Malacca, which divide Singapore and Malaysia from Indonesia, have long been the site of a 
flourishing economy of smuggling (Trocki 1979, 1990). In fact, the history of the border is a 
history of attempts to control the flow of people and goods across the straits. The Anglo-
Dutch Treaty of 1824 gave the Malay Peninsula and the island of Singapore at its tip to the 
British, and Sumatra and the Riau Islands to the south of the Straits of Singapore to the 
Dutch. At that time, the Dutch were much more interested in establishing and policing the 
border between Singapore and the Riau Islands than the English (Tagliacozzo 2007) - an 
interest that reflected their desire to control the movement of contraband across the 
Anglo/Dutch frontier and to regulate the flow of taxes into the colonial coffers. Attempts to 
do so were only partially successful, and a booming cross-border economy (much of it 
deemed illegal by the Dutch) developed that led to the Riau Islands becoming far more 
closely integrated into the Straits economy than they did with the rest of Dutch East Indies.3 
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During the Second World War, the boundary between the Dutch and British spheres was 
even further weakened with the creation of the Japanese 'co-prosperity sphere'. 
Administratively, Malaya and Sumatra were ruled by the 25th Army, which encouraged 
civilian maritime trade, and the Riau islands fell under the administration of Syonan 
(Singapore). The Japanese occupiers played a central role in facilitating smuggling across the 
Straits through the setting up of kumiai (co-operatives) engaged in cross-Straits trade. 
Shortages in food and other products provided opportunities for a new form of smuggling to 
emerge - danbang trade - a type of business conducted by self-employed itinerant traders 
(Twang 1998: 13). The brief period of Allied Occupation that followed was heralded a 
'golden age of smuggling' (Twang 1998: 2T4), but this changed when the Dutch colonial 
authorities returned. Because smuggling was vital to sustaining the economy in Republican 
areas, the Dutch were determined to control the flow of goods across the Straits (Yong 2003). 
However, danbang trade continued and other firms involved in anti-Dutch smuggling 
mushroomed, leading to the founding of import-export associations in Singapore and Penang 
that were directly involved in cross-border barter trade (Twang 1998: 13). Using a 
combination of naval blockades and increased regulation, including the introduction of a new 
banking system that controlled foreign exchange, the Dutch succeeded in controlling the 
trade by the end of 1947. The more determined smugglers, however, were harder to 
eliminate, and the smuggling trade continued, albeit on a much smaller scale and no longer 
openly backed by the British. As a consequence, it became more covert (Twang 1998: 240). 
Cross-border trade remained the mainstay of the islands' economy in the immediate post-
colonial period due to strong demand in Singapore for items from the islands, including 
coconut, copra, rubber and fish.4 Islanders in turn relied on a range of products 'imported' 
from Singapore, including fresh vegetables, rice and clothing. This was the 'Era of the Dollar' 
(zaman dollar) when islanders frequently travelled to Singapore to purchase goods and 
services. Our informants recounted that the islands were 'flooded by Singaporean goods' and 
even local officials were paid in Singapore dollars or 'KS' (Kepulauan Riau dollars). Not only 
were dollars used to buy and sell goods, but price differences between Singapore and the 
Riau Islands were quite stable: local regulations put in place in the 1950s required ships 
bringing in goods from Singapore to present a purchase receipt to Indonesian trade officials 
on arrival into port. The official would then determine a selling price that took into account 
transportation costs. 
In addition to this regulated trade, there was also a considerable amount of what the new 
Indonesian government regarded as smuggling. Some of this trade was highly organised and 
visible. Awang, a Malay teacher from Tanjung Balai Karimun, recalls that during the 1950s 
he was one of the richest men in his community because of the high prices his copra attracted. 
He would ship coconuts from Sumatra to the islands and manufacture copra, which was then 
sent by ship to Singapore. Other cross-border trade activities were conducted on a much 
smaller scale. Sugiyanto, a Javanese day labourer who has lived in Tanjung Pinang since 
1959, recalled that going to Singapore was 'just like going to the market', as islanders would 
regularly row over to Singapore to sell a few kilograms of chillies or rubber. He recollects 
that 'there were no obstacles and no-one bothered us'. Hamzah, a 62-yearold Bugis fisher 
living in the north of the island of Bintan, recalls that he and his brother-in-law regularly 
traded dried coconut and fish in Singapore and bought rice, sugar and clothes in return. None 
of these islanders regarded their business as a form of 'illegal' activity but rather a form of 
'unregulated' cross-border trade. 
All this changed with the period of military brinkmanship and associated low-level 
skirmishes between Indonesia and the Malay Federation in 1963, known as Confrontation.5 
Although Confrontation did not turn the islands into a war zone, its impact on local 
communities was nevertheless dramatic and abrupt, as the movement of goods and people 
across the border became more restricted (Ng 1976). As a result, Riau Islanders were cut off 
from 'their paddies and fields' (sawah ladang) in Singapore and Malaysia. There was little 
agricultural production in the islands and they relied on the importation of fresh vegetables 
and staples such as rice, so when their traditional trade routes were cut, supply dried up and 
food became extremely expensive, as they had to rely on shipments of foodstuffs from Java. 
The goods were first sent to Tanjung Pinang and from there they were transported by boat to 
the outer islands. As Hamzah remembers it: 
During Confrontation it became really hard to get to and from the islands, so it 
was very difficult to keep our relationships with Singapore going. As a result, we 
really suffered economically. It was very difficult to get even basic necessities. 
Sometimes we'd have the money to buy food, and there'd simply be none that we 
could buy. 
According to Rizki, a 65-year-old retired civil servant, islanders 'did it tough' during this 
period because all their official connections with Singapore were cut; although it became 
more dangerous to do so, 'the only thing people could do was to become involved in 
smuggling'. Confrontation affected different ethnic groups in different ways. While Malays 
like Rizki and Hamzah suffered, Bataks and Chinese itinerant traders were able to take 
advantage of their connections in Medan and jakarta to continue trading (Ng 1976). During 
this period, older generations of Chinese businessmen in Tanjung Pinang also suffered, but a 
new group of businessmen emerged and, using their connections with Indonesian officials, 
were able to establish lucrative smuggling businesses (Ng 1976: 51). 
Remote communities suffered the most in the aftermath of Confrontation because of the time 
and distance it took to deliver food and other commodities to the islands. Raja Ali, a Malay 
who lived in Natuna before moving to work in Tanjung Balai Karimun in 1964, recounts that 
shipments from Tanjung Pinang took several days to reach their destination. The quality of 
rice and sugar shipped from Java was 'terrible'. However, he considered himself relatively 
lucky because as a school teacher, his family received 10 kilograms of rice per person. Other 
people received only 200 grams. This did not mean that Raja Ali's family was spared from 
hunger. They shared their rice with a large number of relatives and mixed it with cassava to 
make it last longer. However, his relatives were worse off because they had almost no rice at 
all, and were forced to eat cassava and sago and considered themselves lucky if they could 
mix in a spoonful of rice. 
The end of Confrontation did not signal the end of hardship. The rupiah finally replaced the 
Singapore dollar, and mainland Riau began to dominate the trade of primary products. Food 
and other goods continued to be shipped from Jakarta. Government wages were lower as a 
result of the change in currency, and many public servants turned to smuggling to supplement 
their income. Then, as Zamri, a school principal in Tanjung Balai Karimun, recalls: 
ln 1965, we faced a new problem with the Communist rebellion. Suddenly 
everything had to come from Jakarta and our wages just weren't enough. Lots of 
teachers were involved in smuggling. ln those days, all the government officials 
had two functions (dwifungsi). On weekdays they sat in their offices, but on 
Saturday they'd catch a boat straight to Singapore or Malaysia and buy stuff to 
smuggle back. That's what my family did. 
While small-scale, petty smuggling became almost routine during this period, large-scale 
shipments across the border became more difficult to secure. Awang continued to sell his 
copra in Singapore, smuggling about five tons a week, but the situation became more and 
more difficult. 
It was not until 1968, when relations between Singapore and Indonesia were normalised, that 
things began to improve again as a result of restored cross-border mobility. Ethnic Chinese 
and Malays resumed their movements back and forth across the Straits, although now the 
process of border crossing had become more formal with the imposition of immigration 
controls. Older residents recalled that islanders entering Singapore did not carry passports but 
were required to have their photograph taken and were given a stamp from the Singapore 
immigration post that would allow them to stay in Singapore for 48 hours. Although by this 
time the rupiah had long been the official currency of the islands, a large proportion of 
economic transactions were again being conducted in dollars. A flourishing culture of 
smuggling ensured that islanders evaded import duties and continued to have access to cheap 
products from Singapore. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, most traders operated as they had before the border was regulated. 
During this period, Raja Ali recalled, 'All the armed forces were here, but not because there 
was a war. They were here to trade'. In the 1970s, a 'floating market' ship from Singapore was 
moored in the Malacca Straits and people from Karirnun would take their goods to barter at 
the market. Raja Ali claimed that the direct involvement of the Indonesian armed forces in 
smuggling activities like the floating market helped to improve the quality of life in the 
islands from 1968. Awang also commented on the armed forces' active engagement in 
smuggling during the Suharto years: 
When Suharto was in power, the generals owned the ships. They flew a yellow flag 
so if they were caught by customs, the customs officers would know who owned 
them. It was a good arrangement though, because it meant that it was possible for 
people in Balai to do business in Singapore and Malaysia, and that benefited 
everyone. 
The use of the Singapore dollar for everyday trading and the continued culture of smuggling 
meant that - in contrast to most Indonesian communities at that time - many residents of 
Tanjung Pinang on the island of Bintan had access to television sets (watching Singapore 
channels) and a range of electronic goods (Ford & Lyons 2oo6). 
A decade later, Dasril, an ex-smuggler from Karimun who now has a vegetable stall in the 
local market, travelled to Singapore regularly: 
My brother and I would go to Pasir Panjang to sell rambutan. We'd use the 
profits to buy second-hand goods to bring back to Karimun, like foam 
mattresses, armchairs and electric appliances. It wasn't difficult in Suharto's 
time. We used to make a good profit out of the goods we brought from 
Singapore. You could make a really good living from smuggling. 
Some locals became involved in grand clandestine schemes. One former teacher from 
Tanjung Balai Karimun recounts his induction into the smuggling culture in the rnid-1970S 
after he was approached by the son of an Indonesian general. He couriered thousands of 
watches from Singapore to Jakarta for almost a year, earning five dollars per piece, stopping 
only when he was detained by officers of the national intelligence agency and recruited as a 
spy to track illegal money and drugs coming in from Singapore. However, most smuggling 
was conducted on a much more modest scale, targeting local consumption. According to 
Kifli, a middle-class public servant from Tanjung Pinang, in the mid-1980s, 'everything in 
Pinang was from Singapore'. ln recollecting the culture of smuggling in the 1980s, Raja 
Khaerudin, an ex-teacher and former member of the local parliament and now a high-ranking 
official within the local branch of the Golkar Party, claims that it was considered 'just to be a 
form of trade that had grown out of local practices'. Not only was smuggling considered to be 
a lucrative form of trade, it was also considered to be normal. While some foodstuffs and 
luxury items were cheaper than their Indonesian counterparts, their most desirable 
characteristics were the convenience and speed of delivery and the inherent 'quality' 
characterised by superior performance, durability or taste. Faced with the choice between 
Indonesian products and smuggled Singaporean or Malaysian goods, many islanders chose 
the latter. 
Things had changed considerably by the late 1980s, as the border began to play a much 
stronger symbolic role in marking out the differences between a developing Singapore and a 
backward Indonesia, even though physical movement across the border by traders and 
smugglers continued as it had for decades. At the same time, improved transport routes 
between Sumatra and Java made smuggling less attractive for some traders. For Zald, a 
Chinese businessman originally from Tembilahan, the improved flow of goods from 
Pekanbaru and Jakarta meant that he began to buy mostly Indonesian goods, although if he 
wanted high-tech products he continued to source them from Singapore. However, shortages 
continued to be inevitable because of delays in delivery from Java, and when goods arrived 
they were frequently damaged because of the distances travelled. By contrast, goods coming 
'from across the water' (dari seberang) arrived in perfect condition in a matter of hours. 
The establishment of the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT) in 1990 
brought a new twist in the relationship between the state and the community with regard to 
cross-border trade. The IMS-GT aimed to reduce Singapore's reliance on foreign investment 
and overseas markets and make the economy more resilient in times of recession (Yeung 
1998). The underpinning philosophy of the IMS-GT was economic complementarity in which 
Singaporean capital would be combined with Indonesian and Malaysian labour and land to 
facilitate cross-border regional growth (Sparke, Sidaway, Bunnell & Grundy-Wan 2004). As 
a direct result of the growth triangle initiative, industrial manufacturing zones and tourism 
projects were established on Batam and Bintan.6 Despite the rapid industrialisation that 
followed, the promise of economic growth that underpinned the IMS-GT initiative was not 
entirely fulfilled. 
Yet despite the limitations of the IMS-GT, our respondents perceived the early 1990s as 
another time of prosperity. For Jali, a Bugis man born in Tanjung Pinang, the early 1990s was 
a period of opportunity. He would buy damaged second-hand electronics in Singapore and 
rebuild them for sale in Tanjung Pinang. He describes his activity as 'a form of smuggling. 
You could say we were "playing behind the scenes" (main belakang), on the black market'. 
He would charter a small boat in Tanjung Pinang and load it with mangrove wood. The wood 
was dropped at an unofficial port in the mouth of a small stream near Jurong, where he would 
buy second-hand goods to smuggle back. The entire transaction occurred at the illegal port 
and although he took money with him in case he needed to pay off an official, it was rarely 
required. According to Jali, 'The Singaporean customs guys didn't care what we brought in, 
but the Indonesian customs boats patrol the straits. The most that ever happened though is 
that they'd ask for one of the TVs'. 
Smuggled goods became much less attractive in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis of 
1997-98, when weak exchange rates made it more difficult for smugglers to make a profit. 
Singaporean and Malaysian products were still available but were now much more expensive 
than products brought from Java and elsewhere in Indonesia. However, entrepreneurial 
traders were able to take advantage of the growing size of the middle classes in the islands. 
Topan, a Batak man living in Tanjung Pinang, started smuggling clothing and electronics 
from Singapore in 2002 because of the strong demand for international brands. He trades in 
second-hand goods, which he claims are discarded by rich Singaporeans who constantly seek 
to have the latest products. In spite of the unfavourable exchange rates, Topan claims that he 
is able to buy goods at a reasonable price and make much more money selling them in 
Tanjung Pinang than if he sold brand-new, Indonesian-made products. As Domartin, a former 
journalist and party official from the Karimun branch of the Peace and Welfare Party (Partai 
Damai Sejahtera), says, 'It's not that middle and lower class people in the islands really want 
second-hand goods, but they're a great bargain. Even the bureaucrats will buy them. They're 
often 90% as good as new'. 
The evolving political context in the post-Reformasi period had an even more dramatic 
impact on cross-border trade than changes in the exchange rate over the same decade. As 
Hendri, a hotel worker employed in the Bintan Resort Zone, observed: 
Things have gotten really tough since SBY [Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono] became 
president in 2004. ln the past, there'd be a bit of a shake-up when a new official 
was appointed, but it only ever lasted a month or two. A new police chief would 
be appointed and things would tighten up for a month and then go back to normal. 
This is the first time it's been like this. Lots of people are really unhappy about it. 
One immediate effect of the new political regime has been a crackdown on smuggling. 
According to Leo, a middle-class Malay from the town of Kijang on Bintan, once Yudhoyono 
became President, 'the only people brave enough to bring in rice without paying tax were 
Chinese businessmen'. 
In our interviews with active and former smugglers, many claimed that the central 
government's policy on smuggling had seriously affected them. Tengku Umar, a Malay from 
Tanjung Balai Karimun who runs an import-export business, asserted that the customs duties 
imposed under the new regulations are designed to make particular items more expensive in 
the islands. While some items continue to be easy to smuggle, others have become more 
difficult. For example, the timber and furniture industry has experienced a significant 
reduction in the availability of building materials. According to Nanang, a Javanese from 
Tanjung Pinang, for example, the strict new laws meant it became difficult to buy wood: 'lots 
of shops just don't have any anymore. And when you ask them why they're out of stock they 
say it's difficult to get it in. What they mean is that they can't get it in illegally'. But 
smuggling continued despite attempts by the central government to stop illegal cross-border 
trade. For example, Lini, a Chinese furniture shop owner in Tanjung Pinang still mostly sells 
furniture from Malaysia, travelling there every week or two to buy stock. 
Local ecologies of licitness 
Just as illegal logging generates direct or indirect employment for many people in the local 
community in Aceh (McCarthy 2002: 880), smuggling - along with other illegal or legally 
marginal industries like gambling and commercial sex - plays a vital role in the local 
economy of the Riau Islands.7 As our discussion suggests, communities like those located on 
Indonesia's borders with Singapore and Malaysia regard smuggling as a natural part of life in 
the islands and consider their involvement in it, or their purchase of smuggled goods, as 
legitimate acts that reflect the special character of border life. Abraham and Van Schendel 
(2005: 17) use the concept of licitness to take into account this gap between the state's 
understanding of illegal activity and the understanding deployed by individuals within 
borderland communities, calling for the need to identify the origins of regulatory authority 
and to distinguish between political authority (whether something is legal or illegal) and 
social authority (whether it is licit or illicit). In their study of smuggling between the Gambia 
and Senegal, Golub and Mbaye (2009: 597) argue that smuggling is a 'natural outcome' of 
long trading traditions in Africa which, along with pervasive poverty, creates a drive to obtain 
goods at the lowest possible cost and to earn a living. Niger-Thomas (2001) also invokes the 
concept of licitness (although she does not use this term) in her discussion of smuggling 
along the border of Cameroon and Nigeria, arguing that women traders 'perceived their 
activities as just another business enterprise and saw themselves in a favourable light, as 
entrepreneurs taking risks' (Niger-Thomas 2001: 46). 
While different state responses to cross-border trade have resulted in some of these goods 
being deemed at one time by at least one state to be 'illegal', many Riau Islanders also regard 
these unauthorised flows of products to be a form of licit commerce between traditional 
trading partners. As in Nunukan (see Bakker & Crain in this volume), they are both an 
important source of livelihood and an integral part of the dense web of relationships that bind 
them to friends and kin on either side of the international border. Small-scale smuggling by 
individuals continues to represent an important means of making a living or earning a little 
extra income, and the Chinese and Malays who visit family members in Singapore and 
Malaysia routinely purchase consumer goods like clothes and jewellery, which they smuggle 
back into the islands for sale. Despite the crackdown, there also remains a 'systemic synergy' 
(Passas cited in Antonopoulos 2008: 275) between businesses in the formal sector (such as 
supermarkets, furniture shops, electronics retailers, hardware shops and clothing stores) and 
those that engage in smuggling. 
We propose that smuggling, along with other illegal and semi-legal industries, in fact sits at 
the core of a kind of 'local ecology' in which some forms of illegal activity associated with 
the borderlands are clearly licit. This in part reflects the fact that at different times, the same 
cross-border flows have been designated as 'trade' or 'smuggling', and the goods themselves 
as 'legal commodities' or 'contraband'. As Aseong, a former customs officer and fish exporter, 
observes: 
It usen't to be called smuggling. That term didn't exist then. But now it's there in a 
law. If we bring goods in without the proper paperwork, that's called smuggling. It 
just didn't exist before. In fruit season, everyone used to take fruit from here in 
fruit season - mangoes or rambutan or pineapples or coconuts - and trade it in 
Malaysia or Singapore for other kinds of food. People would see their family at 
the same time. The law has made it more difficult but it hasn't destroyed that 
trading relationship. It's a necessary part of life. 
While locals recognise the authority of the central government to issue laws on smuggling 
and to impose taxes on cross-border trade, they insist that such laws unfairly disadvantage 
islander communities. In the Riau Islands, we were repeatedly told by people from all kinds 
of backgrounds and walks of life that without smuggling, the islands simply could not 
survive. Many Riau Islanders argue that they should have special permission from the central 
government to import staples from Singapore and Malaysia. As Gusril, the computer trader, 
commented: 
To my mind - to the mind of an ordinary person - it doesn't make sense to ban 
imports of things like sugar and rice because we need those things and it's difficult 
to get them from Java. They have to go to Batam first and then they sit around in a 
warehouse for months before they make it to Karimun. If you want staples from 
Singapore, you just need to make a phone call and they arrive the next day. 
According to Arnunidin, who works in a large private firm in Tanjung Balai Karimun, 'We'd 
be much better off if they let us trade freely'. As Hendri, a second-hand clothes seller in 
Tanjung Pinang, argues, 'We're on the border here. We should be given a special exemption'. 
Importantly, even in the absence of such an exemption, Gusril doesn't regard his 'importation' 
of computers from Singapore as a form of smuggling. He and other local business owners 
who sell illegally imported goods do not see themselves as smugglers. Rather, they see 
themselves as entrepreneurs seeking to maximise their profits through clever strategies to 
import cheaper, better-quality products from Singapore and Malaysia. 
There is considerable public support in the islands for this view. These claims for the licitness 
of smuggling rest on a range of intersecting discourses about the proximity of the Riau 
Islands to Singapore and Malaysia, and the price and quality of goods from other parts of 
Indonesia. In our interviews with members of the community who purchased smuggled 
goods, many claimed that the local economy would suffer enormously if smuggling stopped 
because Indonesian products are much more expensive. The 'moral status' (Tremblay, Cusson 
& Morselli 1998) of smuggled foodstuffs and consumer goods is thus very high.8 Not only 
are smuggled goods often still cheaper than similar items produced in Java, they are also 
considered to be of a better quality. Riau Islanders acknowledge that the quality of products 
from Java has improved dramatically since the 1970s but still consider the vast majority of 
them to be inferior. As Awang observed: 
Sometimes domestic products look the same, but after a week or so they start 
disintegrating. So even though imported products are more expensive now, we 
still try to buy them. We only buy domestic products if they're the only ones on 
offer. 
Shopkeepers actively promote the qualities of Singaporean products, often displaying foreign 
products next to Indonesian products and encouraging their salespeople to demonstrate the 
differences in quality. This technique is commonly employed in shops selling foreign items 
that are considerably more expensive than local products. As the Javanese day labourer 
Sugiyanto says, 'Even if the imported stuff is dearer, I still buy it. It might cost more, but at 
least I'm satisfied'. There are, however, limits inherent in the moral discourse of licitness. For 
example, Gusril asserts that unregulated cross-border trade becomes smuggling when large-
scale operators try to sell their products outside of the islands.9 
The problem with the fancy businessmen is that if we ordered ten they'd bring in 
1,000 and smuggle the 990 others out. I’m not sure how they were doing it. So 
that's when all the fuss blew up and importation of electronic goods was banned. 
And we're the ones who suffer. We just want to trade to make a living for our 
families, we're not looking to get rich. 
Many other importers similarly blamed this kind of behaviour on 'outsiders' who break the 
unwritten rules of cross-border trade in the islands and try to make a profit by selling on 
goods to other parts of Indonesia, ruining things for local residents. 
The community also invokes its local ecology of licitness when assessing state engagement in 
illegal cross-border trade, rejecting unreasonable levels of corruption such as that perceived 
to be characteristic of the new layers of local government, but at the same time recognising 
the role that local agents of the state play in ensuring the welfare of borderlanders. In the 
literature, the actions of a central government are often contrasted with those of its officials, 
many of whom benefit from smuggling through the taking of bribes. As Niger-Thomas 
(2001: 46) has observed in another context, 'official corruption is an integral part of all 
smuggling operations, thus grafting informal activities onto the formal sector'. However, 
central government officials are not always in opposition to smuggling, as many of these 
accounts imply. As Sugiyanto observed, 'Groups of officials who come from Jakarta to stop 
smuggling don't apprehend any of the smugglers. They get given smuggled goods as gifts!' 
Importantly, also, local state authorities are not only involved in supporting smuggling 
through corrupt practices; government agencies arc also frequent customers of smugglers, 
both individually and as institutions. For example, a senior officer in the Police intelligence 
and Security Unit interviewed in 2010 acknowledged that his wife purchases contraband Milo 
and sugar from a Chinese-owned shop, arguing that there was no reason why they or other 
local people should purchase expensive, inferior Indonesian products.10 Meanwhile, some of 
the smugglers of high-tech goods that we interviewed reported that government agencies 
were among their best customers. 
This systematic engagement of agents of the state in the economy of smuggling is reflected in 
the extent to which the industry is regularised. As Zainul, a civil engineer and contractor 
working in Tanjung Balai Karimun, observed, 'When goods are smuggled, the person selling 
them only has to pay 'administration costs'. They don't have to pay tax, so they can keep the 
prices down. The costs referred to by Zainul are usually paid by the boat owners or those who 
hire the boats. These costs are then passed on to local entrepreneurs who engage the boat 
owners to 'import' their goods. Gusril sums up the sentiments of the local business 
community: 
I don't think too much about whether the goods I buy in Singapore come through 
official channels. All I need to know is that the goods I buy can be shipped to 
Karimun. What happens on the way here doesn't concern me. It's up to the people 
who own the boat to deal with that. All I do is pay the bill and get the goods. It's 
no big deal. 
As with the scale of smuggling operations, however, there are limits to this routine and 
institutionalised support for what could be called 'mundane' smuggling. For example, Anai 
Oi, a Chinese vegetable trader from Tanjung Balai Karimun, openly brings in vegetables 
from Malaysia. He does not pay taxes on the import of the vegetables but instead pays an 
informal fee to the people who own the boat. He claims that this arrangement has been 
successful because local officials 'don't care too much about veggies. It'd be different if I was 
trying to bring in meat. Then I really would have to have the right paperwork to get my stock 
in'. 
Equally, the community imposes moral boundaries on state interference in cross-border trade 
in ways that are recognisable in other contexts. For example, Prokkola (2008: 671) argues 
that in the context of smuggling between Sweden and Finland, 'the border does not separate 
people but marks a confrontation between state governance and the local way of life'. 
Similarly, in her account of the Benin-Nigeria border, Flynn (I997: 318) claims that for the 
Shabe: 
[B]orderland marginality is made ever clearer by the hovering, hoarding, 
commanding presence of the state, the perceived purpose of which is not to help 
border residents but to hinder their advancement by stifling what was once their 
promising path to development- lucrative transborder trade. 
Regional autonomy and the creation of a new province (Propinsi Kepulauan Riau, Kepri) has 
resulted in a proliferation of government agencies and added a new dimension to state 
corruption in the islands. Local communities have begun to complain about rent-seeking by 
different arms of government, particularly in Karimun, where new layers of administration 
were added when it became a Regency in 2000, creating a range of new positions with the 
result that smugglers who used to have to pay one set of bribes now have to pay two.11 The 
increased presence of the police and navy has also dramatically affected the flow of goods 
across the border. For example, Ahui, a former customs officer in Tanjung Balai Karimun, 
complained to us that suddenly the navy and the police began to interfere with the work of 
customs officials and began to extract additional 'fines' from smugglers. Not only did this 
reduce the profits of smugglers, it also undermined the 'side incomes' (penghasilan 
sampingan) earned by customs officials. 
Ahui's views should not be seen simply as a response to increasing competition for pay-offs. 
He expresses the sentiments of many local officials who argue that these new agents of the 
central government do not appreciate the importance of smuggling to the local economy. 
Similarly, a common reason given for rejecting the post-2004 crackdown on smuggling to 
and from the islands is the view that the central government, which is believed to be 
synonymous with Javanese interests, is working to protect Javanese industries. According to 
Amunidin, a Malay who works for a large private business in Karimun, the government does 
not let Riau Islanders import products from Singapore 'because the Javanese produce these 
things and have trouble selling them here if we're not forced to buy them'. In response to 
pressure from businesspeople, local authorities have lobbied the central government to 
introduce special laws for the islands that would allow them to import foodstuffs from 
Singapore and Malaysia. Mukhlis, a former head of what was then the sub-district of 
Karimun, also argued that changes to the regulations governing the import of food stocks 
from Singapore had an enormous impact on people living in the district, asserting that, 'Sure, 
there can't be room for large-scale trade, but restrictions on the importation of basic needs 
like food and clothing has a terrible effect on local people'. When still in power, Mukhlis 
approached the Minister for Trade to allow basic necessities such as rice and sugar into the 
islands without taxes, but the Minister refused on the grounds that it was not possible under 
the existing laws.12 
Local politicians and officials like Mukhlis both criticise the central government's policy and 
at least in part condone local smuggling activities, which they too see as a necessary part of 
life. This view is summed up in the following observation from Kartini, a former member of 
parliament from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Jndonesia-
Perjuangan, PDI-P): 
People at the centre think that those of us who live in the borderlands 
should go to Jakarta to buy and sell things. But if you think about a small 
island on the border of another country, it makes sense to sell its products 
there. They shouldn't be taxed. Take our little islands close to Singapore, 
for example. The people who lived there just needed a sampan to sell their 
goods in Singapore. Why should they be taxed? There's no way they can 
get to Jakarta! They shouldn't be penalised for smuggling even if it does 
hurt the national economy. Rice, oil, that sort of stuff, all comes illegally 
from Singapore. But what made people around here get involved in 
smuggling is the fact that the national law doesn't take account of local 
conditions. The regulations just don't make sense. I understand that 
Indonesian law applies to the whole of Indonesia. But it's not fair for the 
people of Kepri ... People in Kepri are penalised because we live on the 
border of a country that doesn't have a border with anywhere else in 
Indonesia. So who do you say is creating corruption in Kepri? It's the 
central government! 
These ongoing conflicts between legal processes imposed by the central government, official 
corruption and local discourses of licitness may in part be resolved by the fact that 
decentralisation has allowed locally-based state agents to pass regulations that permit locally 
licit (socially accepted) but formally illegal practices, sometimes even in contravention of 
national laws.13 Where resolution in this way is not possible or perhaps desirable, local 
ecologies of licitness may continue to provide moral sanction for illegal state activity. What 
we are talking about, therefore, is not a gap between the state's understanding of criminal 
activity and individuals' understanding of criminal activity, as proposed by Abraham and Van 
Schendel (2005: 17), but rather a situation in which the agents of local state structures act in 
ways that defy centrally defined notions of legality but conform to the local community's 
understandings of licitness. 
Conclusion 
Smuggling relies on a two-way flow of goods, and therefore the importation of unauthorised 
products goes hand-in-hand with the sale of produce from the Riau Islands in the markets of 
Singapore and Malaysia. Farmers, fishers and small-scale manufacturers depend on the 
regular passage of boats across the straits to reach their markets. For the boat owners and 
transport companies involved in shipping goods across the straits, smuggling is a state-
imposed term to describe their involvement in the reciprocal flow of goods between trading 
partners. Although they pay the special 'shipping charges' involved in bringing goods into the 
islands, the businesses that use their transportation services are generally not interested in 
knowing about the techniques used to evade customs officials, the police or the military. The 
'naturalness' of smuggling is attributed - by smugglers, their customers and by those who 
purchase smuggled goods - to the unique characteristics of island life. These special features 
include the geographical proximity of the littoral states to the border, pre-existing kinship and 
trade ties, and economic complementarity that arises between the trading partners. Smuggling 
is thus an integral part of a reciprocal trade process that has evolved over centuries and is so 
embedded in the local economy of the Riau Islands that it is almost meaningless to try and 
differentiate between the formal/legal and informal/illegal sectors. 
As we have argued here, the experience of the Riau Islands demonstrates the importance of 
exploring how local ecologies of licitness and illegality are shaped by intersecting 
perceptions of community members and local state officials of cross-border trade. In Kepri, 
the licitness of legitimate but illegal cross-border trade and local government corruption is 
juxtaposed against the repressive actions of the central government as it attempts to control 
the border. As our interviews with current and former local government officials and 
politicians revealed, many of these actors view local state involvement in corruption that 
supports smuggling to be a legitimate response to the perceived failures of the national 
government and its lack of appreciation for the special character of border life. In other 
words, distinctions between the legal/licit and the illegal/illicit are complicated by local state 
practices deemed by the community to be a legitimate response to bad laws. According to 
officials and ordinary citizens alike, then, a certain level of local government corruption is a 
legitimate response to the perceived failures of the central government, which is located far 
away in Java and thus unresponsive to the needs of Riau Islanders. 
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Notes 
1 The account that follows is based on interviews conducted between 2004 and 2010 as part of a larger study of 
citizenship and identity among borderland communities funded by an Australian Research Council (ARC) 
                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Discovery Project grant In the Shadow of Singapore: The Limits of Transnationalism in Insular Riau 
(DP0557368). We thank Nick Long for his insightful comments on an earlier version of this chapter and Wayne 
Palmer for his assistance with interviews conducted in 2010 
2 Donnan and Wilson (1999: 101) have noted that much of the scholarship on smuggling gives attention to the 
smuggling of goods into a country rather than out of it. Although Indonesian authorities have given much more 
attention to the flows of goods into Indonesia than they do to flows out of the islands, one exception to this is 
the Singapore government's involvement in the 'illegal' (from the Indonesian perspective) importation of sand. 
By contrast, the Singaporean government has taken little interest in the flows of goods into and out of its 
jurisdiction, with the main exceptions of people smuggling, contraband cigarettes and alcohol and illegal drugs. 
3 The Dutch also imposed regulations on trade between the Riau Islands and Mainland Sumatra. 
4 The islands were incorporated into the Republic of Indonesia after the Dutch finally granted independence in 
1949. 
5 For an account of the background to Confrontation, see Hindley (1964) and Mackie (1974). 
6 For details of major IMS-GT projects, see Peachey et al. (1998) and Pereira (2004). 
7 For an account of the sex industry, see Ford & Lyons (2008). 
8 Wiltshire et al. (2001: 206) found that smokers in the UK expressed a similar view about contraband 
cigarettes. They expressed a positive attitude towards smuggling in view of the high taxes imposed on legal 
cigarettes. as summed up in the following quote: 'to me, they're doing you a favour ... They're doing people a 
service'. 
9 In her study of the Swedish-Finnish border, Prokkola (2008) makes a similar distinction between the ways 
border communities viewed 'traditional' and 'modern' forms of smuggling. Traditional smuggling was not 
regarded as a crime but simply as an activity carried out by 'local heroes' designed to benefit the local 
community. In contrast, modern-day smuggling (e.g. of drugs) is seen to be a form of criminal activity. 
10 According to the officer, there is no tolerance for smuggled luxury goods like televisions, which robs the 
Indonesian government of substantial amounts of tax revenue, but crackdowns on daily commodities only occur 
when prompted by directives from Jakarta. 
11 Kabupaten Karimun was formed with the passing of Law No.13/2000 on the Alteration of Law No.53/1999 
regarding the Formation of Kabupaten Pelalawan, Kabupaten Rokan Hulu, Kabupaten Rokan Hilir, Kabupaten 
Siak, Kabupaten Karimun, Kabupaten Natuna, Kapubaten KuaJ1tan Singingi and tbe City of Batam. 
12 This is not to suggest that the view that the islands should receive special dispensation is not shared by all 
local officials. Leo, an economic adviser to the Bupati, claims that goods from Jakarta are more expensive than 
foreign products because the local government hasn't 'cracked down hard enough' on smugglers. In his view, 
local authorities should close the border so that smugglers are unable to sell foreign goods more cheaply than 
locally-made products. 
13 Ford and Tjandra (2007) observed similar struggles for control in the labour sphere in Surabaya and Batam. 
According to Agung Pambudhi, the Director of the Committee for Regional Autonomy Implementation 
Monitoring (KPPOD, Komite Pemantauan Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah), a large proportion of the local 
regulations dealing with labour passed in 2007 were later annulled because they contravened national labour law 
(interview by Michele Ford, 16 May 2007). 
